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МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО И ОТДЕЛЕНИЕ КРЫМА ОТ УКРАИНЫ (часть 1)

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CRIMEAN SECESSION FROM UKRAINE (part 1)

Введение. Статья посвящена обоснованию позиции крымской Верховной Рады относительно предпосылок отделения от Украины.

Материалы и методы. Чтобы разобраться в затронутой в статье проблеме, необходимо придерживаться судебной методологии. Урегулирование споров требует как установления, так и оценки фактов, их юридического толкования и применения к ним законов. Однако в данной статье установление фактов ограничивается элементами, необходимыми для решения вопроса о том, является ли присвоение права аннексией или отделением.

Результаты исследования. Предлагаемая часть статьи раскрывает позицию Запада в отношении беспорядков в Крыму, т.е. разногласия по поводу того, противоречат ли крымский референдум и решение о независимости («крымская формула») международному праву.

Обсуждение. Рассмотрены вопросы обоснования отделения Крыма от Украины. Каковы были мотивы крымской Верховной Рады? Отвечают ли эти цели праву народов на отделение или нарушают его.

Заключение. С учетом приведенных фактов критика западных держав имеет право на существование. Однако, как показано в статье, события не укладываются в западную версию: антагонисты не раскрывают «историю аннексии» о «вторжении» России в Крым в марте 2014 г.

Ключевые слова: *международное право, отделение Крыма, референдум, государственный переворот, аннексия.*

Introduction. The article reveals the issue of Crimean "Verkhovna Rada" rationale according to "remedial secession" prerequisites.

Materials and methods. To figure out the issues of the article, we need to follow the methodology of legal courts. Thus, an instrument of dispute settlement requires both fact-finding and evaluation of facts, legal interpretation, and application of rules to facts. This article's fact-finding is however limited to elements necessary to adjudicate whether right subsumption is annexation or remedial secession.

Results of the study. This part does reveal "Western position" to Crimean turmoil — i.e. disagreement on whether Crimea process of referendum and resolution of independence combined (the "Crimean formula") is contradictory to international law.

Discussion. This article focuses on following issues: *First,* justification of Crimea secession from Ukraine. Which are the motivations of the Crimean "Verkhovna Rada"? The query is whether these aims supports or ruins peoples' right to remedial secession.

Conclusion. Given all the facts, the western powers' criticism is conceivable. However, as these two articles reveal, Crimea — events does not fit into western version: antagonists fail to make evident "the annexation-story" on Russian "invasion" of Crimea March 2014.

Key words: *International law, Crimean remedial secession, Referendum, Coup d'etats, annexation.*

Introduction

The Crimea conflict, what is it about?

Western powers claim that Crimean referendum prompted Russia's "illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea" [22, p. 2]. The term "illegal and illegitimate" indicates that annexation took place by vigorous interference of troops. Canada further claimed: "Russia has violated international rules-based order and vital international norm that no country can change another country's borders by force" [10].

To consider these positions one need to dive into historic scenery for 2014 events that reversed Khrushchev 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.

Russia gained sovereignty over Crimea after Turkey-Russia war (Treaty of Kuchuck, 1774). Crimea remained Russian until end of Tsar Nicolay II dynasty (1917) when Crimea was incorporated into Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The tug-of-war in aftermath of death of First Secretary of Communist Party, Joseph Stalin resulted in election of Nikita Khrushchev. The decree-text on "passing" Crimea to Ukraine was as follows: "Considering commonality of economy, territorial proximity, and close economic and cultural ties between Crimean Oblast' and Ukrainian SSR, Presidium of Supreme Soviet of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees. Approve *joint submission* of Presidium concerning transfer of Crimean Oblast'" [36].

Communist presidium member Kuusinen supplemented these motives for transferring Crimean territory: "Comrades! ...Only in our country is it possible

that such a great people as Russian people magnanimously transferred one of valuable oblasts to another fraternal people without any hesitation. Only in our country is it possible when such very important issues as territorial transfer of individual oblasts to a particular republic are settled without any difficulties" [21].

The 1954 Nikita Khrushchev draw was not only bureaucratic; it was contradictory to Soviet constitutional law: "The Crimean region in violation of Constitution of USSR, RSFSR and Ukraine was illegally transferred to Ukraine in 1954" [1]. From these texts, my conclusions is that Crimea was Nikita Khrushchev "1954-payback" to his Ukrainian supporters: "The transfer of Crimea to UkrSSR also was politically useful for Khrushchev as he sought to firm up support he needed in his ongoing power struggle with Soviet Prime Minister Georgii Malenkov" [18].

Crimea was part of Ukraine with a special status, by USSR disintegration in 1991. However sovereignty of: "Crimea was proclaimed on September 11, 1991. According to section 10 of Ukrainian Constitution of 1996, territory of Crimea enjoys an autonomous legal status, which is legally applied to rights of peoples. According to Article 138.2 of this section of Ukrainian Constitution, in particular jurisdiction of Autonomous Republic of Crimea includes 'the organization and conduct of local referendums', while possible subject of such referendums is not limited to this special 'Crimean' section of Constitution" [19].

Why do Western powers strongly insist on keeping alive Khrushchev power play of 1954? Why not adhere to September 11, 1991 proclamation as read in connection with Ukraine 1996-constitution?

One underlying key topic is how to execute a breaking away decision from a dysfunctional or failing state? Is referendum — beside often-impossible friendly agreements [27] — only way to lawfully expressing *popular will*?

These texts — neither Part 1 nor Part 2 — do discuss secession from an ethical, moral [55, p. 15—22] or political [54, p. 178] perspective. "Of alienability of sovereign power, one may reach conclusion that issue before South African courts was fundamentally different from any other ordinary legal issue, and that courts were really called upon for a political or legislative decision, having no 'law' to guide them, but having to create new law in a situation which should strictly be called revolutionary".

Excluded is also bi- or multilateral [35] agreements between withdrawing people and former mother-state. Discussion topic is legality of referendum. This article does not discuss legitimacy of military invasion, preemptive strike, annexation etc. Some opponents seem to mix up referendum-question with military invasion [28].

Materials and methods

This law study adjudicates whether Crimean withdrawal from Ukraine satisfies "remedial secession" prerequisites, so as to make "the restoration of historical justice" [16, p. 5]. Alternatively — this is western powers view — whether

Crimean case is an instance of annexation. That latter position require that Russia arranged this all together and forced by use of military power its will upon populous of Crimea To figure this out, we need to follow methodology of legal courts, in casu International Court of Justice in Hague (ICJ).

Although jurisprudence is a normative science, this analysis cannot omit "the living fabric of life" from topic of our study. Thus, instrument of dispute settlement require both fact-finding and evaluation of facts, legal interpretation and application of rules to facts. This article's fact-finding is however limited to elements necessary to adjudicate whether right subsumption is annexation or remedial secession (see Part 2).

The main instrument for considering international legal disputes is ICJ and its adjudication i.a. conventional law as well as customary- and general principles of law [13]. ICJ task is to define conflicting situation, to uncover relevant facts and applying relevant legal principles, according to principles of interpretation.

The legal method is to apply accurate laws of international societies of states. A main source of law is written texts of conventional law, *in casu* UN Charter (1945) and Kellogg-Brian Pact (1928). A starting point is "the ordinary meaning to be given to terms of treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose" [53]. If ordinary understanding of texts makes sense and justification is righteous, legal meaning is clear, and then application of laws to facts gives appropriate solution. If plain reading of text interpreted in its context is unclear or unjust; "leaves meaning ambiguous or obscure"; or "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable" (Article 32 (a)—(b)), ICJ examines "traveaux preparatoire" — preparatory works. If interpretation makes sense and solution is just, we got dispute settlement. If meaning still is ambiguous or obscure, ICJ scrutinizes "judicial decisions and teachings of most highly qualified publicists of various nations" (Statute Article 38.1.d.):

One relevant "judicial decision", which is among "subsidiary means for determination of rules of law", is ICJ-advisory opinion in Kosovo case [17].

"To answer that question (posed by UN General Assembly (GA) on Kosovo's declaration of independence [33]), Court need only determine whether declaration of independence violated either general international law or *lex specialis* created by Security Council [SC] resolution 1244 (1999)" [14].

Why this UN-position? People — often as tribes-member — are since bygone days autonomous and self-sufficient. *"Residual rights principle"* which belongs to sovereign peoples as well as states, is basic structure of this legal system, or as told in ordinary language; right to self-determination and self-government, if not otherwise decided by treaties, customary law or general principle of law. As will be envisaged in this study dispute settlements deduct its results from this UN or SC legal base.

The task of ICJ is to decide all legal disputes concerning (Statute Article 36.2):

a. "the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;

c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation

d. the nature or extent of reparation to be made for breach of an international obligation".

Thus, it is clear that courts role is to interpret to clarify meaning of a — to dispute — relevant text that others than court has conceived. This includes conventional law, general practices followed by many in believing that this is what rule of law requires, i.e. a customary law, or *an a priori b*asic principle recognized as law by civilized nations (Statute Article 38.1.c.).

However, interpretative challenges occur: There is "no right to judicial legislation" [15]. Status quo is often paradoxical — international law is not a comprehensive law such as internal law with its legislator. My best guess is that international law is close to "loop-hole law": A system that suffers from gaps or *lacunaes* (loopholes) raises *non-liquet issue,* (what law is, is unclear) — which gives court no option to decide, but to refer case to legislator (*Judge Vereshchtin*). On other hand, by raising a court case, no parties' intention is to have a *non-liquet* in return [12].

Results of the study

"Pompeo flounders on why annexation
is good for Golan but not for Crimea"

Oona Hataway [11]

The International law is clear: there is no right to annex territory from another state by force, whether in an aggressive or defensive war. Given such facts, this criticism is conceivable. However, as this article reveals there is no legal basis for condemnation of Russia: Russia neither initiated nor forced through Verkhovna Rada (VR) declaration of independence nor Crimean referendum ("Crimean formula"), or manipulated result. Despise of the Wikipedia "documentation" to the contrary is insignificant; "On 27 February, masked Russian troops without insignia took over Supreme Council (parliament) of Crimea". No Russian invasion of Crimea took place in March 2014 [4]. Russian soldiers' — stationed according to an agreement with Ukraine in base of Sevastopol — presence was justified (see Discussion). Thus, case for adjudication is *not* between Russia and Ukraine, but a relation between a national state — Ukraine — and its inhabitants — i.e. people of Crimea and its representatives.

The Crimean referendum on accession to Russia and remedial secession from Ukraine resulted from Ukrainian *coup d'état*. Coup-makers deprived Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankovisk regional councils of their delegated authorities [39]. VR members feared that Crimea should suffer from identical treatment.

As VR decision-making unveil (Discussion), its effort was not to wage war, to opposite; parliament and Presidium worked hard — and succeeded — to prevent unrest, anarchical paramilitary forces and terrorists from invading Crimea. Western powers' strong criticism of Crimean transfer was and is manifestly ill-founded.

Discussion

Annexation versus remedial secession

Pretended *remedial secession* meet limitations: An annexation cannot concurrently qualify as a valid secession: It is either or.

"Annexation is administrative action and concept in international law relating to forcible acquisition of one state's territory by another state and is generally held to be an illegal act... annexation is a unilateral act where territory is seized and held by one state. It usually follows military occupation of a territory" [3].

An annexation is illegal if acquisition is "forcible", i.e, aggressive. It is a "unilateral act" i.e. not according to agreement, it involves "military occupation of a territory" and it is "by another state". There was no Russian "control over territory" at time of declaration of independence and referendum. Failure of one of these conditions ruins all. Clearly, Russian soldiers was already in base of Sevastopol, a town that also hosted Crimean VR, and its presence at parliament was justified due to presidium's invitation (see Discussion). Defensive moves resulted from strong indications on expected attack from Ukrainian paramilitary groups. C.f. understanding "autonomy status and Constitution of Autonomous Republic of Crimea are under threat" [29].

Clearly, a picture of a group of "little Green men" in uniform without insignia is not documenting that Russian annexation took place. Under all circumstances, Russia-Ukraine base treaty authorized Russian soldiers' presence in Simferopol base. Presidium requested that a number of Russia Special Forces protected Crimean VR building during these critical days.

During popular vote, no armed forces were seen in streets or in polling stations. 150 foreign observers found nothing suspect. Overall, an exemplary, peaceful election and a subsequent transition took place — perhaps due to presence of (most possibly) Russian soldiers enforcing law and order in Simferopol, in and close to Crimean parliament. Overall, there was no military attack or aggression. There was no declaration of war, no fighting between Ukrainian and Russian troops.

Clearly, conflict related to Ukraine and people of Crimea, latter of which supported validly elected president Yanukovych, despite revolting pro-EU groups that ousted him from power. My position is that expressing its will in a referendum is no annexation. Western powers fail to document that Russia was in charge of an annexation of Crimea.

The basic principle of self-determination of peoples

A starting point is that International law "contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor explicit denial of such right" [30]. Legal theories differ [9] support that "peoples" benefit from *jus cogens obligatio erga omnes* principle of self-determination, c.f. "World Law" [5, p. 1617] and UN-codifications: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for principle of equal rights and *self-determination* of peoples..." (UN-Charter Article 1.2).

This include, "to promote political, economic, social, and educational advancement of inhabitants as may be appropriate to particular circumstances of each [trust] territory and its peoples and *freely expressed wishes of peoples* concerned" (italic add UN-Charter Article 76 b). Unilateral secession however, is *jus dispositivum and lex inferior* to International law, SC resolutions inclusive.

The main objective is to prevent war (cf. Article 33), thus, International law interpretation should avoid future countries from sharing i.a. Finland [20, p. 8—9] and Croatia [23, p. 467] civil war misfortune.

While right to self-determination belongs to all peoples, unilateral succession — remedial succession included — is restricted. Some *decennia* ago legal scientists supported a latter right for indigenous peoples only [2]. Others did not benefit from such rights, as traditional positions and the case of Yugoslav secessions unveil: [26].

International customary law is however not static but dynamic, see i.a. failing states of Soviet Union and Yugoslav Federation. "Community and its Member States confirm their attachment to principles of Helsinki Final Act and Charter of Paris, in particular principle of self-determination" [8]. "Modern international law has come to embrace right of people to secede from an existing state 'when group is collectively denied civil and political rights and subject to egregious abuses'" [1]. As ICJ affirms, *"one of major developments of international law during second half of twentieth century has been evolution of right of self-determination"* [14, § 82 — italics added]. Thus, while self-determination is clear right to secede is less obvious, but extending [23]. ICJ summarizes:

"the international law of self-determination developed to create a right to independence for peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation A great many new States have come into existence as a result of exercise of this right. There were, however, also instances of declarations of independence outside this context. practice of States in these latter cases does not point to emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting making of a declaration of independence in such cases» [14, p. 437].

If peoples' right to remedial secession is entitled, what are legal effects? UN GA decision of December 14 1960, paragraph 4 stated:

"All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and integrity of their national territory shall be respected" [31].

The salient point is whether this UN-provision is a casuistic result of a general principle of law. As revealed in continuation, I subscribe to position that state practice and case law currently recognizes new cases as eligible for "remedial secession", from "failing states" [7, p. 1491] i.a. right of revolution (or right of rebellion), i.a. subsequent to a *coup d'état*, [25] civil war, terrorism, foreign invasion. In such instances, remedial secession is needed to protect law and order, as was case in i.a. Yugoslavia.

The VR motivation for claiming "remedial secession"

An ICJ-dispute settlement require both evaluation of facts, legal interpretation and application of rules to facts (see Results of the study). Often salient point is how to describe "living fabric of life" in casu events that advanced Crimean referendum. Does preceding facts substantiate Crimean MPs need for withdrawing from Ukraine? Is this motivation according to prerequisites of "remedial secession" (see Part 2)?

Political situation in Ukraine was tense before referendum. Viktor Yanukovych was President of Ukraine from 25 February 2010 to 22 February 2014. An EU-association agreement caused internal cleavage between EU- and Russia supporters, Parliament of Crimea referring to its resident's support to the president Russia-friendly policy [49]. VR warned against Ukraine paramilitary groups, pointing at their capability to tear apart Ukraine state: parliament supported suspension of preparation process for EU association Agreement" [39].

The condition gradually deteriorated towards end of 2013: Verkhovna Rada characterized state as "acute political crisis" and they "supported President of Ukraine V.F. Yanukovych, legitimately elected authority of country, which defend national interests". In same vain VR condemned "the attempts of forcible seizure of power in country by opposition..." [39].

The Presidium of VR called once again on its citizens to keep calm which was followed by December 11 2013 appeal [41]: It again reminded its population on "Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankvisk regional councils" Svoboda experinces [42].

On 23rd anniversary of re-establishment of Autonomous Republic of Crimea Crimean Presidium addressed President Viktor Yanukowych to stand up against treats from extra-parliamentary forces that fought for "regime change" [43].

Yanukovych signing of Moscow agreements instead of EU-association Agreement caused a further national cleavage. VR-proclamation ended with this assurance: "We are determined to defend historic choice made 23 years ago at All-Crimean Referendunm on issue of re-establishment of Autonomous Republic of Crimea!" [44].

Two days later VR presidium referring to Ukrainian constitutional system condemned attempted *coup d'état*, "The riot participants announced that they "were taking power into their hands, they obey decisions of self-proclaimed "People's Rada" and began to form illegitimate authorities" [51].

In this situation, "autonomy status and Constitution of Autonomous Republic of Crimea were under threat" [45]. VR had nothing else to do than to reconsider which steps to take.

The *coup d'état* unfolded during February 2014. VR made it clear that in this situation "there shall not be any power vacuum and warned against how unscrupulous politicians have plunged country into chaos and brought it to brink of civil war" [46].

The absence of legitimate authorities resulted in "failing states" *inter alia* due to lacking law enforcement. Discriminatory supervision and enforcement of Ukrainian criminal codes of Ukraine resulted in strong criticism of office of

Prosecutor General of Ukraine, which failed to protect law and order against "Svoboda" and other radical organizations [47].

The situation deteriorated throughout month of February as verified by this statement: This resulted in use of new remedies "Crimea reserves right to call residents of autonomy to stand up for protection of civil peace and stability on peninsula" [48].

Armed groups threatened Crimean representatives when returning from EU-initiated talks in Belorussia: They "were ambushed and violently attacked by Ukrainian nationalists (later vividly "reenacted" as Korsun Pogrom" [24]. This event resulted in this appeal to all Crimeans to "protect life, health, rights and freedoms of citizens and to ban radical organizations" [52].

Thus, next step was to urge popular will as decided on 6 March 2014 on Crimean territory to remain in Ukraine or to search for a reunion with Russia after 60 years as autonomous republic of Ukraine. VR launched Republic of Crimea independent declaration of March 11, 2014, claiming its right to self-determination according to its self-governing power ("the Crimean formula").

The next step taken by Presidium of Verkhovna Rada was to prepare for referendum. Popular vote took place 16 March 2014. Census participant numbers was 83.1% in Crimea and in Sevastopol 89.5%. Alternatives were as follows:

- Would you prefer Crimea to incorporate with Russia as legal subject within Russian Federation?
- Do you support restoration of Crimean Constitution of 1992 and thus its status as part of Ukraine?

Crimean in general; 96.77% of participants, said yes to first alternative. In Sevastopol number was 95.6%. No troops appeared in streets. Neither Russian nor Ukraine troops interfered with Crimean Parliaments decision of March 6th 2014 nor with referendum of March 16th 2014. Around 150 observers verified that no irregularity was observed during voting [52]. Thus, Crimea did not breach UN-Charter Article 2.4. Despite of this, representatives of western *Corps Diplomatique* characterizes electrion as "a charade", however with following reservation: "if elections were free and fair and with proper security conditions as stated in Minsk Agreements that would be a different matter" [16].

The aftermath of Referendum

Nonetheless; USA denounced outcome and appealed to SC to condemn Russia for arranging referendum: It was illegal and illegitimate. USA spoke wrongfully [6] of "annexation[1] of Crimea and continued violation of international law" [34], fully overlooking prelude to secession from Ukraine, importance of *coup d'état*, and overwhelming popular support for accession to Russia.

Russia refused to take responsibility for referendum or outcome. VR and not Russia enquired people's voice. No Russian interference took place. To cont-

[1] Cambridge Dictionary: "possession taken of a piece of land or a country, usually by force or without permission".

rary, VR representative had to persuade Russia to involve in transferal of Crimea from Ukraine and to Russia.

The Ukrainian unconstitutional dismissal of legally elected president Yanukovych furthered Russian position. Ukrainian Constitution was suspended. Consequently, Russia claimed that Crimean referendum on its future incorporation to either Russia or Ukraine was result of Ukrainian *coup d'état*.

The final step was completed when Republic of Crimea and Russian Federation signed accession treaty at Kremlin on 18 March to formally initiate Crimea's accession to Russian Federation [4].

Russia vetoed USA SC-proposal, and USA then brought proposal before GA [32].

The condemnation gained support among GA member states 27 March 2014. 100 votes for disapproval, 11 states voted against, 24 countries was absent and 58 countries abstained. Vote was a recommendation only, and thus non-binding. Regardless of result, USA, EU and other countries boycotted Russian products and interests.

The constitutional stance

Council of Europe on 7th March 2014 — not to be confused with EU Council — asked Finnish Professor of Law, Karlo Tuori (heading European Commission for Democracy through Law, also called Venezia Commission) to conduct a constitutional analysis whether Crimean accession to Russia «is compatible with constitutional principles». Commission swiftly declared that referendum was against Ukrainian laws despite fact that «Ukraine does not, at moment, have a law regulating local referendums» [37]. Crimea was not, even as an autonomous republic of Ukraine, competent to succeed from Ukraine caused by a local vote, only. Restructuring of borders is according to Ukrainian constitution due to all-Ukrainan vote. Why professor Tuori was asked to respond to constitutional questions — and not international law issues, is unclear. Was it perhaps because answer to first one was obviously in favor of western powers?

The Commission's critique was inadequate simply because its perverted focus on internal Ukrainian constitutional law solely instead of considering International law.

Regardless of this shortcoming Commission also failed to consider *coup d'état* — which removed President Yanukovych, and banished Ukraine into a constitutional crisis.

Conclusion

The International law is clear: there is no right to annex territory from another state by force, whether in an aggressive or defensive war. Given such facts, western powers criticism is conceivable. However, as these two articles reveals, Crimea — events does not fit into western version: antagonists fail to make evient "the annexation-story" on Russian "invasion" of Crimea March 2014. Russia neither initiated nor forced through VR-declaration of independence nor Crimean referendum ("Crimean formula"), or manipulated result.

Evident is only that Russian Special Forces were flown in and stationed according to base-agreement with Ukraine, in Sevastopol to protect Parliament building against Ukrainan paramilitary groups.

The Crimean referendum on accession to Russia and secession from Ukraine resulted from Ukrainian *coup d'état*. Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankvisk experience was frightening [51]. VR worked hard to keep anarchy at bay and to defend Crimean institutions and lawfully elected representatives.

Summa summarum: lawfully elected members of VR escaped *coup d'état* in Kyiv. MPs was in its full right to defend its position and to hit back on "destructive" political groups — i.a. "Svoboda", "Batkivshina" and "Udar" [38] — several of which threatend democratic rule *in case* by moving from separatist appeals in direct violation of current Ukrainian constitution [50].

The VR-alert against these groups "seizure of administrative buildings", "forcible seizure of power", "provoke aggressive moods and spread hysteria" and "violence and anarchy" [39]. Such activities will plunge "Ukraine into chaos, life and security of our citizens will fall under real threat" [40]. Further, Svoboda — deprived Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankvisk regional councils of their delegated authorities, which contradicted Constitution of Ukraine and Law of Ukraine" [51]. Instead of defecting to rebells and coup-makers, "We are determined to defend historic choice made 23 years ago at All-Crimean Referendum on issue of re-establishment of Autonomous Republic of Crimea!" [44].

The 1954 now rectified illegal transfer was an internal Soviet matter. Upper Soviet did not ask opinion of Crimean people. No western power interfered with transfer. When VR finally asked Crimea people's opinion, western powers protests heavily and communicates myths, effects of which is to defend Khrushchev undemocratic transfer of Crimea.

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